Abstract-A lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with state information available causally at both the encoder and the decoder is established. The lower bound is shown to be strictly larger than that for the noncausal case by Liu and Chen. Achievability is proved using block Markov coding, Shannon strategy, and key generation from common state information. The state sequence available at the end of each block is used to generate a key to enhance the transmission rate of the confidential message in the following block. An upper bound on the secrecy capacity when the state is available noncausally at the encoder and the decoder is established and is shown to coincide with the aforementioned lower bound for several classes of wiretap channels with state.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
ONSIDER the two-receiver wiretap channel with state depicted in Fig. 1 . The sender wishes to communicate a message reliably to the legitimate receiver while keeping it asymptotically secret from the eavesdropper . The secrecy capacity for this channel can be defined under various scenarios of state information availability at the encoder and the decoder. When the state information is not available at either party, the problem reduces to the classical wiretap channel for the channel averaged over the state and the secrecy capacity is known [1] , [2] . When the state is available only at the decoder, the problem reduces to the wiretap channel with augmented receiver . The interesting cases to consider, therefore, are when the state information is available at the encoder and may or may not be available at the decoder. This raises the question of how the encoder and the decoder can make use of the state information to increase the secrecy rate. This model is a generalization of the wiretap channel with shared secret key in [3] and can be used also as a base model for secret communication over fast-fading channels in which the sender and the receiver have some means for measuring the channel statistics but the eavesdropper does not. In [4] , Chen and Vinck established a lower bound on the secrecy capacity when the state information is available noncausally only at the encoder. The lower bound is established using a combination of Gelfand-Pinsker coding and Wyner wiretap coding. Subsequently, Liu and Chen [5] used the same techniques to establish a lower bound on the secrecy capacity when the state information is available noncausally at both the encoder and the decoder. In a related direction, Khisti et al. [6] considered the problem of secret key agreement first studied in [7] and [8] for the wiretap channel with state and established the secret key capacity when the state is available causally or noncausally at the encoder and the decoder. The key is generated in two parts: the first using a wiretap channel code while treating the state sequence as a time-sharing sequence, and the second is generated from the state itself.
In this paper, we consider the wiretap channel with state information available causally at the encoder and the decoder. We establish a lower bound on the secrecy capacity, which is strictly larger than the lower bound for the noncausal case in [5] . Our achievability scheme, however, is quite different from the scheme in [5] . We use block Markov coding, Shannon strategy for channels with state [9] , and secret key agreement from state information, which builds on the work in [6] . However, unlike [6] , we are not directly interested in the size of the secret key, but rather in using the secret key generated from the state sequence in one transmission block to increase the secrecy rate in the following block. This block Markov scheme causes additional information leakage through the correlation between the secret key generated in a block and the received sequences at the eavesdropper in subsequent blocks. We show that this leakage is asymptotically negligible. Although a similar block Markov coding scheme was used in [10] to establish the secrecy capacity of the degraded wiretap channel with rate limited secure feedback, in their setup no information about the key is leaked to the eavesdropper because the feedback link is assumed to be secure. We also establish an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with state information available noncausally at the encoder and decoder. We show that the upper bound coincides with the aforementioned lower bound for several classes of channels. Thus, the secrecy capacity for these classes do not depend on whether the state information is known causally or noncausally at the encoder.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide the needed definitions. In Section III, we summarize and discuss the main results in this paper. The proofs of the lower and upper bounds are detailed in Sections IV and V, respectively.
0018-9448/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE II. PROBLEM DEFINITION Consider a discrete memoryless wiretap channel (DM-WTC) with discrete memoryless state that consists of a finite input alphabet , finite output alphabets , , a finite state alphabet , a collection of conditional probability mass functions (pmfs) on , and a pmf on the state alphabet . The sender wishes to send a confidential message to the receiver while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper with either causal or noncausal state information available at both the encoder and decoder.
A code for the DM-WTC with causal state information at the encoder and decoder consists of the following: a message set ; an encoder that generates a symbol according to a conditional pmf for ; and a decoder that assigns an estimate or an error message to each received sequence pair . We assume that the message is uniformly distributed over the message set. The probability of error is defined as . The information leakage rate at the eavesdropper , which measures the amount of information about that leaks out to the eavesdropper, is defined as . A secrecy rate is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of codes with and as . The secrecy capacity is the supremum of the set of achievable rates. We also consider the case when the state information is available noncausally at the encoder. The only change in the aforementioned definitions is that the encoder now generates a codeword according to a conditional pmf , i.e., a random mapping that depends on the entire state sequence instead of just the past and present state sequence. The secrecy capacity for this scenario is denoted by . The notation used in this paper will follow that in [11] .
III. SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS
We present the results in this paper. The proofs of these results are given in the following two sections and in the Appendix.
A. Lower Bound
The main result in this paper is the following lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the DM-WTC with state information available causally at both the encoder and decoder.
Theorem 1:
The secrecy capacity of the DM-WTC with state information available causally at the encoder and decoder is lower bounded as (1) where is of the form and is of the form .
Note that if , the aforementioned lower bound reduces to the secrecy capacity for the wiretap channel. Clearly, this lower bound also holds when noncausal state information is available at the encoder, since we can always treat the noncausal state information as causal state information. Define (2) Then, (1) can be expressed as
The proof of this theorem is detailed in Section IV.
Remark 3.1:
Using the functional representation lemma [12] , can be equivalently written as
Unless otherwise stated, this equivalent characterization for will be assumed for the rest of this section to derive other results. From Section IV onward, we revert back to the original characterization in (2) .
In [5] , the authors established the following lower bound for the noncausal case: (4) From (3), is clearly at least as large as this lower bound. Hence, our lower bound (1) is at least as large as this lower bound (4) . We now show that the lower bound (4) is as large as . Fix , , and in . Let in bound (4) . Define the conditional pmfs: for , let , and let otherwise. Under this mapping, it is easy to see that and the other terms in (4) reduce to those in . The following shows that our lower bound (1) can be strictly larger than (4) .
Example: Consider the channel in Fig. 2 , where , , and the conditional pmf defined in the figure. The state with entropy is observed by both and . By setting independent of and in , we obtain .
We now show that is strictly smaller than . First, note that However, for , we must have . Hence, we must have . Next, consider
Step holds with equality iff for all . From the structure of the channel, this implies that for all .
Step holds with equality iff , or equivalently . This implies that given , and are independent,
. But since , either 1) or 2) must hold. Now, consider the pair . Then, we must have either 1) or 2)
. In 1), is a function of and . In 2), we have Since , we have , which implies that . Here again is a function of and . Hence, in both cases 1) and 2), must be a function of and , which implies that is also a function of and . Using the fact that for all , we have
The first expression in is, then, upper bounded by This shows that . The proof of Theorem 1 is detailed in Section IV. To illustrate the main ideas, we outline the proof for the characterization of in (2) for the case when . Our coding scheme involves the transmission of independent messages over -transmission blocks. We split each message , , into two independent messages and with . Codebook generation consists of two steps. The first is the generation of the message codebook. We randomly generate sequences , , and partition the set of indices into equal size bins. The indices in each bin are further partitioned into equal size sub-bins . The second step is to generate the key codebook. We randomly bin the set of state sequences into bins . The key used in block is the bin index of the state sequence in block . To send message , is encrypted using the key to obtain . A codeword is selected uniformly at random from sub-bin and transmitted using Shannon's strategy as depicted in Fig. 3 . The decoder uses joint typicality decoding together with its knowledge of the key to decode message at the end of block . Finally, at the end of block , the encoder and the decoder declare the bin index of the state sequence as the key to be used in block . To show that the messages can be kept asymptotically secret from the eavesdropper, note that is transmitted using Wyner wiretap coding. Hence, it can be kept secret from the eavesdropper provided . The key part of the proof is to show that the second part of the message , which is encrypted with the key , can be kept secret from the eavesdropper. This involves showing that the eavesdropper has negligible information about . However, the fact that is generated from the state sequence in block and used in block results in correlation between it and all received sequences at the eavesdropper from subsequent blocks. We show that if , then the eavesdropper has negligible information about given all its received sequences.
B. Upper Bound
We establish the following upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with noncausal state information available at both the encoder and decoder (which holds also for the causal case).
Theorem 2:
The following is an upper bound to the secrecy capacity of the DM-WTC with state noncausally available at the encoder and decoder:
for some , , and such that . The cardinality of the auxiliary random variables can be upper bounded by , and . The proof of this theorem is given in Section V.
C. Secrecy Capacity Results
We show that the upper bound in Theorem 2 coincides with the lower bound in Theorem 1 for the following cases.
1) Class of Less Noisy Channels:
We show that Theorems 1 and 2 are also tight when for every such that form a Markov chain, i.e., when is less noisy than (see [13] ) for every state [13] .
Theorem 3:
The secrecy capacity for the DM-WTC with the state information available causally or noncausally at the encoder and decoder when is less noisy than is Consider the special case when and is a degraded version of ; then, Theorem 3 specializes to the secrecy capacity for the wiretap channel with a key [3] Achievability for Theorem 3 follows directly from Theorem 1 by setting and observing since is less noisy than . Hence, the achievability scheme for is optimal for this class of channels. To establish the converse, we use the less noisy assumption to strengthen the first inequality in Theorem 2 as follows:
where follow from the less noisy assumption. The proof of the second inequality follows by the data processing inequality, which yields .
2) Channel is Independent of State and Eavesdropper Is
Less Noisy Than Receiver: Next, consider the case where and the eavesdropper is less noisy than , that is, for every such that . Then, the capacity of this special class of channels is Achievability follows by setting independent of . We note that the scheme here is basically a "one-time pad" scheme where the message that is transmitted is scrambled with a key generated from the state sequence. Here, the secrecy capacity is achieved by , and hence, . The example we gave to illustrate the fact that can be larger than is a special case of this class of channels. The converse follows from Theorem 2 and the observation that since is less noisy than and and . Encoding: We send messages over -transmission blocks. In the first block, we randomly select an index . The encoder, then, computes and transmits a randomly generated symbol for . At the end of the first block, the encoder and the decoder declare such that as the key to be used in block 2.
3) Specific Mutual Information
Encoding in block proceeds as follows. To send message and given key , the encoder computes . To ensure secrecy, we must have [14] . The encoder then randomly selects an index such that . It then computes and transmits a randomly generated symbol for .
Decoding and Analysis of the Probability of Error:
At the end of block , the decoder declares that is sent if it is the unique index such that , otherwise it declares an error. It then finds the index pair such that . Finally, it recovers by computing . To analyze the probability of error, let and define the following events for every :
The probability of error is upper bounded as Note that the first term is equal to zero by the independence of and past transmissions, the codebook, and state sequence. For the second term, we have We now bound each term separately. Consider the first term where follows from the fact that and .
Step follows by Lemma 1 which requires that 1) as , and 2) ; 1) can be established using the same steps as in the analysis of probability of error.
Step follows by the independence of and .
Step follows by the Markov Chain relationship The last step follows by the fact that is independent of and uniformly distributed over . Next, consider the second term where follows from the same steps used in bounding and follows from Lemma 1, which requires the same condition . Next consider
From Proposition 1, , which implies that
This completes the analysis of the information leakage rate. Rate Analysis: From the analysis of probability of error and information leakage rate, we see that the rate constraints are Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination (e.g., see Lecture 6 in [11] ), we obtain where follows by the independence of and and the fact that is a function of and .
Case 2:
With : In this case, only part of the key generated from the previous block is used to encrypt the message transmitted to the eavesdropper.
The other part of the key is used to generate additional uncertainty about the message sent at the eavesdropper to ensure that a sufficiently large secret key rate is achieved in the current block. Note that we only need to consider the case where . 
which implies
Hence, the rate of information leakage tends to zero as if . To prove (5) and (6), we need the following.
Proposition 2:
, where , , and as . The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix B.
Part 3 of Proposition 2 implies (5) since Part 1 of Proposition 2 implies (6) since , which implies that . Rate Analysis: The following rate constraints are necessary for Case 2:
Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination, we obtain
Case 3:
: Achievability of uses the same techniques as Case 2 for . However, here the key generated in a block is used only to encrypt the message in the following block. The eavesdropper may be able to decode the message transmitted in a block, which would reduce the key rate generated at the end of that block. This is compensated for by the fact that the entire key is used for encryption. The codebook generation, encoding, and analysis of probability of error and equivocation are, therefore, similar to that in Case 2.
As an outline, in each block, we generate a key of size . In the next block, we encrypt the message using to obtain . A codeword is then selected from a codebook of size less than . This codeword is then transmitted by generating according to for . The decoder first decodes using and then decrypts the message using .
Remark 4.1:
An important difference between the schemes for achieving and is that the transmitted codeword in the scheme for can be kept secret from the eavesdropper through a combination of Wyner wiretap coding and encryption of the codebook using the secret key. This fact was made clear in Case 2 of the proof, where part of the key was explicitly used to encrypt the codebook instead of the message. On the other hand, no effort was made to keep the transmitted codeword secret from the eavesdropper in the scheme for . Hence, one cannot assume that the eavesdropper has no information about the codeword sent. As such, we did not use the Shannon strategy as in Fig. 1 in the encoding part for . If we had used the Shannon strategy, we would have obtained the expression The first term in , , is the rate of the secret key rate generated assuming that the eavesdropper knows the transmitted codeword. As a result of this term, is simply a special case of our original expression, where we maximized the rate over ( independent of ). This is in contrast to the equivalent characterization of in (3), where we were able to perform the maximization of the rate over . We now turn to the proof of achievability of . To prove (7) and (8), we will use the following. , where and as . The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix C. It is clear that (7) and (8) 
VI. CONCLUSION
We established bounds on the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with state information causally available at the encoder and the decoder. We showed that our lower bound can be strictly larger than the best known lower bound for the noncausal state information case. The upper bound holds when the state information is available noncausally at the encoder and the decoder. We showed that the bounds are tight for several classes of wiretap channels with state.
As we have seen, the secrecy capacity for several special classes of the wiretap channels with state available at both the encoder and the decoder does not depend on whether the state is available causally or noncausally. An interesting question to explore is whether this observation holds in general for our setup.
We used key generation from state information to improve the message transmission rate. It may be possible to extend this idea to the case when the state information is available only at the encoder. This case, however, is not straightforward to analyze since it would be necessary for the encoder to reveal some state information to the decoder (and, hence, partially to the eavesdropper) in order to agree on a secret key, which would reduce the wiretap coding part of the rate. 
